Seriously. They knew Hood was a political appointment, much like Bragg. Hood was a backstabber also. The command of the Confederate AoT did not respect Hood much. Forrest loathed him, Hardee had to get away from him, Cheatham thought he was an idiot. Sherman knew Hood was weak in all aspects of militarism. The political knuckleheads of Stanton, Halleck etc were all screaming because Hood was making them look bad by marching all the way to the Cumberland. It took Hood two days to cross the Tennessee at Athens, AL. against a division. Hood was all hype. As was the point of issue that my post was directed towards. Were any of the "real" leaders (Sherman, Grant) genuinely concerned about Hood's last great hurrah? Lincoln, Stanton, Halleck, easily excited about the "Hype"! Sherman could care less, and Grant was just knee-jerking from Lincolns messages from the likes of Stanton and Halleck.
I wouldn't go that far. But I'll defer my time to, & await a post from, our own Sam Hood.
Respectively,
Zouave _________________ "Some kid 100 years from now is going to get interested in the Civil War and want to see these places. He's going to go down there and be standing in a parking lot. I'm fighting for that kid" -- Brian Pohanka
I don't mind going that far. HOOD WAS ALLLLLLLLLLL HYPE!
Hood was nothing without the Texas Brigade. They were some of the best soldiers in the entire war. I would not hesitate to say that his soldiers made him "hype". Hell, those guys could have made Bragg look like he knew what he was doing. After he left the ANV things went down hill for him. He was shot to hell and back to boot and the North's greatest ally,(Grant's quote) Jefferson Davis replaces Johnson with him?
I'm not going to even mention the drug problem. The guy should of been in charge of the coastal defenses somewhere.
My final point or opinion..... He was ill-fit to command the Army of Tennessee at that point. He was not subordinate minded enough to take orders from Johnson, or any of the other Western Generals at that time.
Sadly to say when it was all said and done, He was just a big joke to everybody.
"And the gallant Hood of Texas played hell in Tennessee"
I'm not going to even mention the drug problem. The guy should of been in charge of the coastal defenses somewhere.
CavHead,
We've been all over this subject here on this forum. And there are no contemporary accounts which state that JBH took laudanum, etc. There are a lot of mights & maybes. But beyond that nary a thing.
Respectively,
Zouave _________________ "Some kid 100 years from now is going to get interested in the Civil War and want to see these places. He's going to go down there and be standing in a parking lot. I'm fighting for that kid" -- Brian Pohanka
Joined: Mar 04, 2004 Posts: 4926 Location: Suburb of Philadelphia
Posted: Wed Jul 09, 2008 8:37 am Post subject:
CavHead wrote:
Hood was nothing without the Texas Brigade. They were some of the best soldiers in the entire war. I would not hesitate to say that his soldiers made him "hype". Hell, those guys could have made Bragg look like he knew what he was doing.
And I could argue that the leader makes the soldiers just as effectively as vice versa.
Lets see - Napoleon was nothing without Old Guard
Rommel was nothing without Afrika Corps
Patton was nothing without 6th US Army
Leonidas was nothing without Spartans
Hannibal was nothing without Elephants
Hmmm.... _________________ I Remain
Your Ob't Servant
Allan
Time sets all things right. Error lives but a day. Truth is eternal.
A Great Civilization is not Conquered from Without until It has Destroyed Itself from Within
The drug problem wasn't mentioned, commented on, or used to further my point.
CavHead,
Forgive me if I read it wrong. But I did detect an inference in what you wrote:
"I'm not going to even mention the drug problem. The guy should of been in charge of the coastal defenses somewhere. "
So, accent efect or not, your statement says he had a drug problem. I'm just asking for contemporary documentation.
Zouave _________________ "Some kid 100 years from now is going to get interested in the Civil War and want to see these places. He's going to go down there and be standing in a parking lot. I'm fighting for that kid" -- Brian Pohanka
As general pete, yes...sometimes. It's subjective. Hood didn't make the Texas Brigade.
Zoauve, once again drugs or no drugs the dude couldn't pull it off. I'm sure the dope was really good for him after Nashville though.
My point..Sherman could have cared less about Hood. Hood was not a threat to his objective. Hood had a snowball's chance of hell of getting anything accomplished in Tennessee due to his lack of overall ability to lead the Army of Tennessee successfully. He was not trusted nor respected by "middle management". After Atlanta, it was apparent that Hood would smash the Army of Tennesse against any enemy entrenchment he could find. Maybe Sherman knew this?
Part of a military leader's operartional mind would be to constantly evaluate the oppositional leadership. Sherman did not respect Hood.
Napoleon was respected and feared by most
Patton did well with the 3rd Army. He was respected also. He also had one hell of a staff.
Leonidas was a Spartan.
Hannibal ran around Italy for a long time after the last elephant died.
Hood was not respected, didn't win crap with the AOT, Was not a true southerner nor Texan, and he didn't last very long after his "weapons of intimidation" died off.
Sherman did not perceive hood as a threat to his march to sea.
Joined: Mar 04, 2004 Posts: 4926 Location: Suburb of Philadelphia
Posted: Thu Jul 10, 2008 10:59 am Post subject:
I believe Sherman gambled on the fact that Thomas would hold Hood at bay - he was correct. Had, by any chance, Hood been successful in threashing Thomas - rest be assured Sherman would have perceived him as a threat very fast.
As to the other stuff - I merely mentioned that with all due respect one cannot simply waive off the Leader's ability and chalk everything up to the soldiers. Why would Texans fight so ferociouosly and become a unit they did without having any respect for their Leader? (MD campaign of 62 comes to mind when they all clamor - Give us HOOD back). Plenty of musings are also abound as to what possible outcome could have been in Gettysburg on Day 2 if Hood was not taken out of action so early.
I dont know how much respect he had or didnt have in AoT - I am admittedly not well versed in the WTO and stick my nose in there much rarer that I should. I do have to agree with Zouave that there is no creadible evidence of him using drugs and that I simply took a dim view to the "Hood was nothing without Texas Brigade" statement (as per already given explanation) _________________ I Remain
Your Ob't Servant
Allan
Time sets all things right. Error lives but a day. Truth is eternal.
A Great Civilization is not Conquered from Without until It has Destroyed Itself from Within
The consensus I've deduced in the past is that Hood was good at the brigade level, but was in over his head as an Army commander.
Excuse my ignorance or forgetfulness, but did Hood even command a corps? It seems like he kind of level jumped. _________________ "Let us have faith that right makes might..."
- Abraham Lincoln
Joined: May 12, 2008 Posts: 15 Location: Salem, Ohio
Posted: Thu Jul 10, 2008 12:45 pm Post subject:
James_Longstreet wrote:
CavHead wrote:
Hood was nothing without the Texas Brigade. They were some of the best soldiers in the entire war. I would not hesitate to say that his soldiers made him "hype". Hell, those guys could have made Bragg look like he knew what he was doing.
And I could argue that the leader makes the soldiers just as effectively as vice versa.
Lets see - Napoleon was nothing without Old Guard
Rommel was nothing without Afrika Corps
Patton was nothing without 6th US Army
Leonidas was nothing without Spartans
Hannibal was nothing without Elephants
Hmmm....
Actually Patton was nothing with the 6th Army seeing as how he commanded the 7th in Sicily and the 3rd in mainland Europe. _________________ There is no capital without labor.-Lincoln
Joined: Mar 04, 2004 Posts: 4926 Location: Suburb of Philadelphia
Posted: Thu Jul 10, 2008 1:14 pm Post subject:
OY! Thats why I switched to Elephants
Chris - I do not think so; he was basically promoted straight into the COmmand of the Army _________________ I Remain
Your Ob't Servant
Allan
Time sets all things right. Error lives but a day. Truth is eternal.
A Great Civilization is not Conquered from Without until It has Destroyed Itself from Within
General you are a man of integrity and wit. Touche' sir.
Hood or what was left of him, was appointed as a Corp commander in Joe's army. Hood, Polk, and Hardee were the corp commanders. I had initially believed that he took over Polk's corp after his death. I was wrong. He had a corp in the army following his return.
To yours and those who are yours
Truly a good day!
“Psychological impact” on a population and country, I find, is hard to measure. Most of the time it is hard to gage. I find most people putting that forward as an argument, don’t supply statistics, facts or evidence, primarily because none exist. When Lee surrendered the south still had ~200,000 men under arms. The last surrender came on May 26, 1965 By Kirby-Smith. Don’t sound too demoralized to me.
WAS SHERMAN'S MARCH effective? There seem to be two approaches involved in this answer, and both result in the affirmative. If for a moment we forget the actual material damage done the Confederacy and consider where Sherman's army started and where it finished, the march in itself was the definitive act of retribution against the South. Sherman's capture of Atlanta probably saved Lincoln the election. The very fact that he could march unharmed through the South eroded all support in the North for Democrats and Copperheads who advocated negotiated peace or surrender under the guise of settlement. Overseas there would be no further talk of recognizing the Confederacy.
Moreover, in purely strategic terms, Sherman was now three hundred miles closer to the last major source of Confederate resistance, Lee's army in Virginia. Until Sherman reached Savannah, Grant was holding Lee firmly in his grasp and waging, whether intended or not, a brutal and steady war of annihilation. When Sherman reached the Atlantic--as he had foreseen all along--the complexion of that death lock changed radically: Lee was faced with the prospect of a lethal force marching steadily northward at his rear, devouring the source of supply for his army, and ruining the homes of his soldiers in the trenches. Whereas before, Lee had kept Grant out of Richmond and had the option either to threaten Washington or to just stay still, now he had to move either northward over Grant or southward through Sherman.
Had Sherman not torched a single Southern estate, his march would nevertheless have been strategically brilliant for its role in the coordination of the Union armies--and psychologically devastating to the Confederate cause. As the artillery officer Thomas Osborn wrote when Sherman and his men reached Savannah: "Thus the immediate object of the campaign is completed. This army has been transferred from the middle of the country to the sea coast, this city captured and the lines for supplies for General Lee's army south of here are destroyed. The Confederacy proper is now southern Virginia and North and South Carolina. It has no other territory now at its disposal for military operations and this campaign has shown there is not much more left to it, except General Lee's army and the small force in our front."
Damage, of course, Sherman did. Even by 1870 the assessed valuation of farms in Georgia was little more than a third what it had been ten years earlier. Unfortunately for the poor of the South, the ripples of Sherman's plunge into the Georgian countryside continued for decades; the result of his depredations against the plantations and state was to create years of general economic stagnation that would affect both the free black and white poor. Sherman's apologists--and in the years after the armistice they continued to shrink as the horror of frontal infantry assault was forgotten--would defend his actions on three grounds: First, better that Southerners be poor and alive in Georgia than rotting in the mud of northern Virginia--and the South's only apparent strategy of salvation was the doomed quest to crush Grant's Army of the Potomac; second the poverty of a few hundred thousand citizens for decades was to be reckoned against the bondage of millions of slaves for centuries; and third, war cannot be "refined." Revolutionaries suffer inordinately when they precipitate war, lack the high moral ground, and turn out to be impotent. Sherman would come to be hated in a way Grant never would be because he humiliated and impoverished the South with ease and impunity, rather than kill Southern youth with difficulty and at great cost.
THE MARCH THROUGH Georgia made all subsequent campaigns by the Army of the West easier. Hundreds of thousands of Confederate civilians, once so critical in encouraging their men at the front, now would have precisely the opposite effect. When Sherman turned north into the Carolinas, Confederate soldiers wrote their governor: "It is not in the power of the Yankee Armies to cause us to wish ourselves at home. We can face them, and can hear their shot and shell without being moved; but, Sir, we cannot hear the cries of our little ones and stand."
This natural reaction had been foreseen by Sherman: "I attach more importance to these deep incisions into the enemy's country, because this war differs from European wars in this particular: we are not only fighting hostile armies, but a hostile people, and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war, as well as their organized armies. I know that this recent movement of mine through Georgia has had a wonderful effect in this respect. Thousands who have been deceived by their lying newspapers to believe that we were being whipped all the time now realize the truth, and have no appetite for a repetition of the same experience."
Whereas much has been written of the destruction of Southern morale, too little has been devoted to the radically changed spirit in the North brought on by Sherman's march. Lincoln put it best as he summed up the Union effort in his annual message to Congress on December 6, 1864: "[We] have more men now than we had when the war began.... We are gaining strength, and may, if need be, maintain the contest indefinitely." Grant's army was a force vital to the preservation of the Union and the destruction of the best Confederate soldiers in the field, but neither Grant nor the Army of the Potomac--given the frightful casualties of summer 1864 and the absence of movement forward--could embolden the American populace to continue the war.
Americans might now sing "Marching Through Georgia" or read poems about "The March to the Sea"; they would never write hymns to celebrate Cold Harbor or read verses about "The Wilderness." Sherman--in light of his army's speed, his preservation of Union lives, his transection of the Confederacy, the sheer hatred he incurred from the South, and his gift for the language of doom--captured the mind of America. In a little more than thirty days he had redefined the entire Civil War as a death struggle between yeomen farmers and the privilege of aristocratic plantationists, and the verdict of that ideological contest was plain for all to see in the burning estates of central Georgia. Had Sherman not taken Atlanta, Lincoln might not have been re-elected President; had he lost his army in Georgia, a negotiated peace would have been a real possibility; and had he rested on his laurels in Savannah, Grant would have fought Lee for another six months to a year. It is true that Sherman redefined the American way of war, but his legacy was not Vietnam but rather the great liberating invasions of Europe during World War II, in which Americans marched right through the homelands of the Axis powers. Sherman, in short, invented the entire notion of American strategic doctrine, one that would appear so frequently in the century to follow: the ideal of a vast moral crusade on foreign soil to restructure a society through sheer force of arms.
As I said earlier, the VAST majority of Historians believe that the March WAS important. Was Sherman overrated? Probably. Does that mean what he did was useless & that he never won a fight? Absolutely not. That is your opinion & I can see from the exchanges in the North/South discussions that a lot of folks don't agree. I'll respect you enough to say, "You can believe what you want". I hope you can do the same for us. _________________ My politics are of a practical kind - the integrity of the country, the supremacy of the Federal government, an honorable peace, or none at all.-Winfield Scott Hancock
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HOOD WAS ALLLLLLLLLLL HYPE!
They were some of the best soldiers in the entire war. I would not hesitate to say that his soldiers made him "hype". Hell, those guys could have made Bragg look like he knew what he was doing. After he left the ANV things went down hill for him. He was shot to hell and back to boot and the North's greatest ally,(Grant's quote) Jefferson Davis replaces Johnson with him?
to everybody.
